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employed becomes aware that the property is not needed 
the prosecuting attorney shall be so advised, giving a 
description and details of ownership. When the 
prosecuting attorney, by such notice or otherwise, 
becomes aware that the property is not needed he shall 
give written notice to the owner. Upon proof of 
ownership and lawfulness of possession satisfactory to 
the prosecuting attorney, the prosecuting attorney shall 
give the owner written authorization which shall entitle 
the owner to receive the property from the person having 
custody of it. When property so obtained is received in 
evidence, it shall be retained by the clerk of the court 
last receiving it or shall be returned by him to the 
custody of the peace officer until all direct appeals and 
retrials are final, at which time the property shall be 
returned in accordance with this slection. In the event 
that the prosecuting attorney con$iders it necessary to 
retain control over the evidence,, in anticipation of 
possible collateral attacks upon the judgment or of use 
in some potential prosecution, he may decline to 
authorize return. 
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AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
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immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 7: 
Sec. 7 [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived df life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Plaintiff/Respondent : 
v. : 
THOMAS GENE DAVIS, : Case No. 870221-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Category No.2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from an order and judgment 
against Thomas Eugene Davis denying Appellant's Motion to 
Compel the Return of Property seized from him at the time of 
his arrest. Charges against appellant were dismissed; however, 
on May 12, 1987, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge, Third 
Judicial Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
entered his order refusing to require the State to return the 
property to Mr. Davis. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 30, 1984, $277.38 was seized from the person 
of Appellant Davis incident to his arrest after an 
investigation which is reflected in Findings of Fact numbered 1 
through 8. See Findings, Conclusions and Order on Defendant 
Davis' Motion to Compel Return of Property (R-121-135 at 
122-123). 
After the case was dismissed as to Davis, he immediately 
requested that the money seized from him be returned to him. 
See Finding No. 10 (R-124). The prosecutor promptly made a 
determination that the money seized from Davis was no longer 
••needed as evidence" within the meaning of Section 77-24-2, and 
he notified Davis* attorney that he was prepared to authorize a 
return of the property to Davis "upon proof of ownership 
satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney." See Finding No. 11 
(R-124). 
After Davis failed to provide proof of ownership 
satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney, Davis filed a motion 
to compel the return of the property which was denied after 
hearing. See Findings Nos. 13 and 14 (R-124-125). 
In its Memorandum Opinion the court held that a 
proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution was the 
appropriate forum but that Davis* refusal to respond to 
specific inquiry by the prosecutor regarding his ownership and 
the lawfulness of his possession of the property precluded the 
relief that he sought. See Finding No. 15 (R-125) and 
Memorandum Decision (R-84-87). 
At the court•s suggestion, further proceedings were held 
in which Davis testified before the prosecutor under oath and 
provided detail regarding where he had obtained most of the 
money. See Findings Nos. 16 and 17 (R-125). 
After the further proceeding and after investigation, the 
prosecutor again declined to return the property to Davis. 
Davis filed a Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, which 
was held on August 20, 1986 and at which the prosecutor and the 
detective who investigated the allegations by Davis, testified 
regarding th€* evidence and information which they had which 
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showed that the money was likely part of the proceeds from the 
crime with which Davis had been charged as a party. See 
Findings 18-20 (R-126). Based on the re|cord before it and the 
testimony adduced at the hearing on the Motion for Evidentiary 
Hearing, the court concluded that Davis had failed to meet his 
burden of proof that the prosecutor had abused his discretion. 
See Conclusions 1-3 (R-127). Davis brings this appeal from the 
Order entered based on those Findings and Conclusions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE METHOD OF HANDLING THE 
PROCEDURE DETAILED IN 77-24-2 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953 
AS AMENDED) IS ONE ANCILLARY TO TH]E CRIMINAL TRIAL, 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS THE SAME AS THAT REQUIRED IN 
A CIVIL RATHER THAN A CRIMINAL CASE,. 
After examination of Section 77-24-*2 Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953 as amended) the trial court determined that it had 
jurisdiction to review the prosecutor's decision not to return 
the seized property in a proceeding ancillary to the criminal 
case. In its Memorandum Decision, th^ trial court further 
stated that it did not feel restricted to compel appellant to 
bring a civil action to recover his funds. However, the trial 
court also stated that the statute doles provide the County 
Attorney with the discretion and authority necessary to make 
reasonable inquiry into whether the defendant may "lawfully 
possess" the property. Further, if appelllant is not satisfied 
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with the decision of the prosecutor, he may seek further review 
by the trial court in an appropriate evidentiary hearing. 
Appellant argues that due to the statute's being placed 
in the criminal code, it is inherently criminal in nature. 
This argument ignores the unique nature of Section 77-24-2. 
That section specifically details a procedure to be followed in 
disposing of property seized but no longer needed as evidence 
in criminal trials. The language is as follows: 
Upon proof of ownership and of lawfulness of 
possession satisfactory to the prosecuting 
attorney, the prosecuting attorney shall give the 
owner written authorization which shall entitle the 
owner to receive the property from the person 
having custody of it. Section 77-24-2 Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended). 
It is clear by the enactment of this statute that the 
legislature intended the prosecutor to be charged with the 
administrative responsibility to make this determination. By 
using the language "upon proof of ownership and lawfulness of 
possession," the legislature intended the burden of proof to be 
on the claimant to the property. Further, that such proof be 
to the satisfaction of the prosecutor. This burden more 
closely resembles a civil proceeding rather than the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard required in criminal cases. 
Whether the trial court's determination that a hearing 
ancillary to the criminal case is the proper forum is correct 
or not, the result is the same since the burden and standard of 
proof would be the same in either event. 
Appellant further argues that the trial court erred by 
failing to order the preparation of a transcript. To support 
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this position appellant cites to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
77-3-1 (1953 as amended), which grants defendants the right to 
appeal after conviction, and Section 77-32-5 (1953 as amended), 
which requires the county to carry the costs of preparation of 
transcripts for this first appeal o£ right. Again this 
argument misses the mark. We are not dealing with a first 
appeal of right in this case. Furthermote, as has been shown, 
the proceeding under Section 77-24-2 is not criminal in 
nature* Therefore, it more closely resembles forfeiture cases 
where the proceedings are considered civil rather than criminal 
in nature. This principle was considered in Resek v State, 706 
P.2d 288 (Alaska 1985) where the Alaska Supreme Court stated, 
MAn in rem proceeding for forfeiture of various types of 
property used or intended for use in connection with a felony 
violation of state drug laws is intended as a civil, not a 
criminal, sanction and, hence is not a "criminal prosecution" 
within provision of Constitution [Const. Art.l sec.11 ] 
affording an accused a right in all criminal prosecutions to 
appointed counsel at public expense." 706 P.2d at p.293. 
Therefore, appellant's argument that since this 
proceeding is criminal in nature he should be afforded a 
prepared transcript and not required to go forward with proof 
of lawful ownership fails to take into consideration the 
language of Section 77-24-2. Here we are dealing with a unique 
statute that specifically outlines a procedure whereby 
appellant need only demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the 
prosecutor, that the monies were not unlawfully obtained. 
Appellant failed to convince the prosecutor that the monies 
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were lawfully obtained and on review the trial court upheld the 
decision of the prosecutor. Those determinations were made in 
accordance with the procedures specifically detailed in Section 
77-24-2 and should be affirmed. 
POINT II. DUE PROCESS WAS SATISFIED IN THIS CASE 
A* Appellant was given the opportunity for a 
hearing and a forum for review was made 
available. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated, "implicit in the due 
process clause of our state constitution is that persons be 
afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law." 
Gribble v Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). In this case, 
Section 77-24-2 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), provides for 
such a hearing. 
Appellant cites Hulbert v State, 607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 
1980), and In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1981), to 
demonstrate what is required for a statute to satisfy due 
process. A close examination of those cases reveals that due 
process was satisfied in this case. 
In In re Boyer, infra, the Utah Supreme Court clearly 
defined what is required to meet due process safeguards. 
First, the statute must clearly define the scope of permissible 
conduct. Xd at 1087. Section 77-24-2 does just that. The 
statute directs the prosecutor to investigate and/or take 
evidence sufficient to establish "proof of ownership and 
lawfulness of possession to the satisfaction of the prosecuting 
attorney." Upon presentation of such proof, the prosecutor is 
- 6 -
required to H give the owner written authorization which shall 
entitle the owner to receive the property from the person 
having custody of it." 
The court further stated in Boyter, "A statute which 
effects fundamental liberties is unconstitutional if it is so 
vague that men of common intelligence mu$t necessarily guess at 
its meaning...H citing to State v Packard. 122 Ut. 369, 374, 
250 P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1853). Here appellant was given 
detailed instruction concerning how he might obtain the return 
of what he alleged was his lawful property. The statute is 
more than clear on the procedures to follow to obtain that end. 
B. There is no necessity under Section 77-24-2 
UCA (1953 as amended) for determination by a 
neutral party as long as jhe prosecutor's 
decision is subject to review. 
Appellant's argument that in Section 77-24-2 cases the 
prosecutor is not a neutral and detached magistrate, is not on 
point. As the state has demonstrated, this proceeding is not 
"criminal in nature" and therefore well settled law dealing 
with search warrants, i.e. Coolidae v pjew Hampshire, 403 US 
443, 29 LEd 2d 564 (1971), has no application to this case. 
The state has further demonstrated that appellant's burden of 
proof is civil rather than criminal in nature, under Section 
77-24-2, and as a result, due process concerns are somewhat 
lessened. 
The notion that differing standards of due process are 
applied in various types of proceedings is firmly entrenched in 
our jurisprudence. In One Lot Emerald (Jut Stones v U.S., 409 
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U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct 489 (1971), the United States Supreme Court 
held/ "A civil forfeiture proceeding was not barred by an 
earlier acquittal of criminal charges because of the 
differences in the types of sanctions imposed and in the 
burdens of proof." In this case appellant should not be 
allowed to argue that the dismissal of his criminal charges 
necessarily requires the return of the seized property in issue. 
Appellant's argument that, under Section 77-24-2, the 
prosecutor possesses unfettered discretion that is incompatible 
with due process is without merit. Not only did the trial 
court retain jurisdiction to review the decision of the 
prosecutor, such an evidentiary hearing was held in this case. 
Moreover, appellate review of the trial court's 
determination, concerning the decision of the prosecutor, is 
available to the appellant. Due process is, and has been, 
afforded to appellant by the laws of this state. 
POINT III. APPELLANT FAILED TO MEET THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF NECESSARY UNDER SECTION 77-24-2, UTAH CODE 
ANN. (1953 AS AMENDED). 
On August 20, 1986, Judge Hansen held an evidentiary 
hearing to determine if the prosecutor abused his discretion in 
refusing to return the property seized from the appellant at 
the time of his arrest. On February 10, 1986, Appellant 
presented a sworn affidavit to the court declaring his 
ownership of the property. Appellant and his attorney met with 
the prosecutor on June 19, 1986, and the appellant testified, 
under oath, concerning how he came into possession of the 
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property. Appellant was unable to account for how he came into 
possession of all the monies when he w^s questioned at that 
time. As a result/ the prosecutor was not satisfied that 
appellant was the lawful owner of the inoney, as required by 
Section 77-24-2. 
Appellant cites Campbell v Cochrar^ , 416 A.2d 211 (Del. 
Super. 1980)# and argues that under its holding the prosecutor 
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the money was 
stolen or otherwise unlawfully obtained. This argument avoids 
the real issue. Under Section 77-24-2/ as has been 
demonstrated/ it is the appellant/ not the prosecutor/ who 
carries the burden of showing lawful ownership. Here, all 
appellant offered was a sworn affidavit and unsupported 
testimony. Therefore, the prosecutor acted within his 
discretion in denying return of the property to the appellant. 
At the evidentiary hearing held on August 20/ 1986, the 
appellant called the prosecutor to testify. The prosecutor 
testified at length regarding the basis upon which he concluded 
that appellant had failed to prove, to the prosecutor's 
satisfaction, that appellant was the owner of the property. 
See Findings of Fact numbered 19 and 20 (R-126) . The trial 
court heard the arguments of both sides and determined that the 
prosecutor had not abused his discretion in any way. If 
appellant can make no stronger showing that the property is 
lawfully his than a conclusory statement jthat he is the owner, 
backed by unsupported testimony of odd jobs, he has failed to 
meet his burden of proof, particularly when his proof is 
weighed against the other information available to the 
prosecutor showing that the property may h^ve been stolen. 
POINT IV, SECTION 77-24-2 DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTION-
ALLY SHIFT THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO THE APPELLANT. 
Appellant's final argument is that Section 77-24-2 
operated to unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof, 
thereby denying him due process protections. Again appellant 
relies on criminal cases to demonstrate that the burden of 
proof remains on the prosecutor at all times. Pierre v Morris, 
607 P.2d 812 (Utah 1980); State v Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 1265 
(Utah 1984) . Again these cases do not address the real issue 
in this case. Respondent agrees that the burden does not 
shift from the state to the defendant as to proof of the 
elements which establish the defendant's guilt. However, the 
defendant's guilt is not the issue in a hearing under Section 
77-24-2. Like other issues which may be raised ancillary to 
the criminal trial, a hearing under Section 77-24-2 has no 
bearing on any element tending to establish a defendant's 
guilt. Rather, the issue is whether a prosecutor abused his 
discretion. The burden on that issue is properly upon the 
party claiming that the prosecutor has abused his discretion. 
The facts and issues in this case are remarkably similar 
to the facts and issues in State, Etc v Everett District 
Justice Court, 585 P.2d 1177 (Wash. 1978). There the Supreme 
Court of Washington, sitting en banc, held: 
The superior court was correct in its conclusion 
that the property in question should not be 
returned to appellant. There is good reason to 
believe the property may have been stolen, and the 
doubts on this matter were not resolved by the 
affidavit of the appellant's attorney. The rule 
contemplated that the claimant, by his own 
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testimony or affidavits , will show the court 
sufficient facts to convince it of his right to 
possession. If such a showing is not made/ it is 
the court's duty to deny the motijon...." 585 P.2d 
at 1182. 
Under Section 77-24-2, the prosecutor is given discretion 
to refuse to return property seized from an accused if the 
accused fails to prove ownership or lawfulness of possession 
satisfactory to the prosecutor. If the prosecutor abuses that 
discretion, the court will reverse the prosecutor's decision 
but the burden is properly upon the accused to prove that the 
prosecutor abused his discretion. 
The state has repeatedly demonstrated that Section 
77-24-2 more closely resembles a civil proceeding and is not 
criminal in nature. The closest parallels are those cases 
dealing with forfeiture proceedings after a criminal trial. 
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v U.S., (infra). In another 
forfeiture case the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "It is the 
property owner's burden in a civil forfeiture proceeding to 
show that possession of the property seized as a public 
nuisance is not unlawful." People v I^ ot 23, 735 P. 2d 184 
(Colo. 1987). 
Section 77-24-2 then does not unconstitutionally shift 
the burden of proof to the appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
In Section 77-24-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), 
Utah has adopted a unique statute which details specific 
procedures to be followed in disposing of property seized but 
no longer needed as evidence in criminal qases. 
It is clear by the enactment of Section 77-24-2 that the 
legislature intended the prosecutor to be charged with the 
administrative responsibility to make a determination a) that 
the property is no longer needed as evidence; b) that the 
claimant is the owner; and c) that the claimant may lawfully 
possess the property. 
The trial court has determined that the proper forum for 
review of the decision of the prosecutor, under Section 
77-24-2, is in a proceeding ancillary to the actual criminal 
trial. Appellant sought and was granted such a review and the 
trial court properly held that the prosecutor's determination 
that appellant had not satisfactorily established his ownership 
was not an abuse of his discretion in this case. Therefore, 
appellant was in no way denied due process in this case. 
This appeal seeks to get around the procedures 
established by the legislature in the enactment of Section 
77-24-2. Section 77-24-2 and due process have been accorded to 
appellant in this case, and the decision of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this // day of February, 1988. 
AMES F. HOUSLEY // 
feputy County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JAMES F. HOUSLEY, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, 
hereby certify that eight copies of the foregoing will be 
delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, 
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Elizabeth Bowman, Attorney for Defendant, Salt Lake Legal 
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IN THIS DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CINDY L. SLAGOWSKI, 
GWENDOLON CARTER HALL, 
THOMAS EUGENE DAVIS, 
CARL LINDELL BARR and 
LARRY DARWIN PERSON. 
Defendants. 
: FINDINGS* CONCLUSIONS AND 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT DAVIS' MOTION 
TO COMPEL RETURN OF PROPERTY 
Case NO. CR 84-1483 
Hon. Jud^e Timothy R. Hansen 
Defendant Thomas Eugene Davis' Motion to Compel the 
Return of Property, to-wit: $277.38 in cash seized from said 
Davis at the time of his arrest, came on Regularly for hearing 
on the 7th day of November, 1986, before the Honorable Philip 
R. Fishier, Judge, Defendant Davis being present and 
represented by his Counsel, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, and the State 
being represented by Walter A. Ellett, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney, and the parties having presented their evidence and 
arguments and the Court being fully advised^ enters its: 
State v. Davis 
Findings, Conclusion and Order 
Page 2 
FINDINGS 
1. That on October 30f 1984, at approximately 3:45 p.m., 
David Bascom, an investigator for the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, personally observed Cindy Slagowski (true name Becky 
Turner, hereafter "Turner"), Thomas Eugene Davis (hereafter 
"Davis"), Larry Darwin Person (hereafter "Person"), Carl 
Lindell Barr (hereafter "Barr"), and Gwendolon Carter Hall 
(hereafter "Hall"), conversing with each other and moving 
around and about two motor vehicles parked in a parking lot at 
715 West North Temple; 
2. That: said Bascom observed said Davis and said Turner 
embracing and kissing and observed said Hall inside one of the 
vehicles shuffling papers that appeared to be credit cards or 
similar documents, and saw said Hall hand some of the said 
papers to said Turner; and 
3. That said Bascom continued to observe said 
individuals and observed Turner enter one vehicle and drive to 
First Interstate Bank, 1955 West North Temple, with the other 
four individuals in the second car following; 
4. That at approximately 4:00 p.m. on said date, said 
Turner cashed a forged check in the amount of $396.86 at said 
bank, and received $396.86 in payment therefor, and that the 
other four individuals remained outside in the second vehicle; 
and 
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5. That said Bascom observed the first vehicle, being 
driven by said Turner, drive out of the parking lot of said 
bank and travel eastbound on North Temple, followed by the 
second vehicle, containing the other four individuals, 
following; 
6. That at approximately 4:15 p.m. on said date, said 
Turner was arrested attempting to pass a second forged check 
drawn on the same account at 710 South 200 West; 
7. That Davis, Person, Barr and C4rter were arrested a 
few minutes later in the second motor vehicle at approximately 
200 South 400 West and there were periods during those minutes 
when the second motor vehicle was not under police surveillance; 
8. That a search of all five individuals and both motor 
vehicles yielded no cash from either car; thirty-three cents in 
the possession of Barr; $3.97 in the possession of Slagowski; 
$11.95 in the possession of Carter; $151.09 in the possession 
of Person; and $277.38 in the possession of Davis, for a total 
of $444.62, which exceeded the amount received total by Turner 
Of $396.86 by $46.76; 
9. That all five individuals were arrested and 
prosecuted in a two-count Information, that Turner pled guilty, 
and that on February 3, 1986, the case against the other four 
individuals was dismissed pursuant to the State's motion, which 
recited "that the witnesses who observed cfriminal activity are 
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unable to make positive identification of said defendants, and 
that the State would not be able to meet its burden of proof 
with the evidence available at this time"; 
10. That Davis immediately requested the return of the 
money and no other person has made formal claim to the funds; 
11. That the prosecutor, James F. Housley, after 
consultation with the case detective, determined that the 
$277.38 seized from Davis was no longer "needed as evidence" 
within the meaning of §77-24-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, and 
notified Defendant through his attorney that he was prepared to 
authorize the return of said property to Davis upon "proof of 
ownership satisfactory to the prosecuting attorney"; 
12. That at a meeting held in the office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney on February 10, 1986, Davis presented a 
pre-prepared affidavit which has been marked as Exhibit "A" and 
attached hereto by reference, and declined, upon advice of 
Counsel, to be questioned under oath concerning the manner in 
which he had come into possession of said money, and James 
Housley, the prosecutor, refused to authorize the return of the 
money to Davis, and that Davis did not sign a receipt prepared 
by James F. Housley, attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
13. That Counsel for Davis filed a Motion to Compel the 
Return of the Property under the criminal heading and noticed 
it up for hearing before the undersigned, to whom the criminal 
case had been assigned; 
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14. That after argument and submission of memoranda by 
both parties on the issue of whether a proceeding ancillary to 
the criminal case was a proper forumf as opposed to a separate 
civil proceeding, to determine whether the prosecutor under 
§77-24-2 had abused his discretion; 
15. That this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion, a 
photocopy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and by 
reference made a part hereof; 
16. That on June 19, 1986, Davis $nd his attorney met 
with Housley in Housley"s office, and that Davis answered, 
under oath, questions regarding the soutces of the $277.38 
seized from him at the time of his arre$t. Davis' testimony 
was that some of the funds were the result of auto detail work 
for Steve Fisher at a Salt Lake auto paint shop, and that most 
of it came through a business arrangement he had with one Mike 
Garrity wherein they would sell property for Jack Bernel of 
Peddler's Pawn Shop, Eighth South 200 West, at swap meets and 
other places and receive a part of the proceeds; Davis 
explained that these two sources probably did not account for 
all of the monies; 
17. That Prosecutor Housley took the position that he 
was not going to authorize the return of said funds to Davis 
until forgery detective Jerry Campbell coyld verify or refute 
his allegations respecting it; 
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18. That Davis1 Counsel filed a Motion for an 
evidentiary hearing on July 15, 1986, which was scheduled for 
hearing on August 20, 1986; 
19. That at the August 20th hearing. Prosecutor Housley 
testified that he was not prepared to authorize the return of 
the money to Davis for the following reasons: 
a) That Detective Campbell had not been 
able to contact the persons mentioned by 
Davis in the June 19 meeting, and could not 
either confirm or refute what Davis had 
stated at said meeting; 
b) That the facts reflected in Findings 
numbered 1 through 8 above demonstrated to 
Housley that it was very likely that in the 
time between the receipt of the money by 
Turner and the arrest of all parties it 
would be extremely unlikely to dispose of 
the money received by Turner; and 
c) That Housley had been told by Counsel 
for Person during plea negotiations that 
Person and Barr had obtained the forged 
checks, recruited Turner to cash them, had 
given Turner half of the proceeds from the 
one check that she successfully cashed, and 
had not seen what Turner had done with her 
half of the proceeds; 
20. That at said hearing. Detective Campbell testified 
that he had made an effort a few days before the hearing to 
contact the individuals named by Mr. Davis without success, and 
that he had been unable to verify or refute Davis' statements; 
21. That a record of all proceedings in this Court on 
Davis' Motion to Compel the Return of Property has been made by 
State v. Davis 
Findings, Conclusion and Order 
Page 7 
the Court Reporter, and that the cost of preparing a transcript 
of said proceedings would be far in excess of the amount of 
money which is the subject of these proceedings. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. That an ancillary proceeding in the above-entitled 
criminal case is the appropriate forum fot determination under 
§77-24-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, whether or not the 
prosecuting attorney has abused his discretion in declining to 
authorize the return of property no lonaer needed in the 
prosecution of said criminal case to Davis; 
2. That the burden of establishing that the prosecuting 
attorney has thus abused his discretion i|s upon the claimant, 
in this case Davis, and that the standatd of proof is by a 
preponderance of the evidence; 
3. That Davis has failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the prosecuting attorney abused his 
discretion in this case; and 
4. That proceedings ancillary to a criminal case to 
determine whether the prosecuting attorney has abused his 
discretion in declining to authorize the Return of property no 
longer needed in a criminal prosecution tinder §77-24-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, is not the kind of a 
proceeding where the Court must or should require the State to 
bear the cost of preparing a transcript of such proceedings. 
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ORDER 
Based on said Findings and Conclusions, and good cause 
appearing therefor, it is hereby ORDERED: 
1. That Davis' Motion to Compel the Return of Property 
be, and the same hereby is, denied; and 
2. That Davis' Motion to Compel the' State to Bear the 
Cost of Transcribing the Record of these/ancillary proceedings 
be, and the same hereby is, den] 
DATED this /<>? day of May( 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
^fa&~- e-aJbay 
Judge 
**"' £"* "F" ATTES 
Attorney for Defendant, Davis 
(Copy Received May JJ_, 1987) 
J>y 
1
 4C&e*>rl./ 
Deplete* 
A F F I D A V I T 
STATE OF UTAH 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Thomas E. Davis, am the lawful owner of the 
$277.00 taken from me at the time of my arrest. 
DATED this. _J>_~day of February, 1986. 
THOMAS £. DAVI$ 
. & r£*.-L 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this Jojjr d 
of February, 1986. 
My Commission Expires: 
aay 
3-y7-gg NOTARY PUBLIC Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
-&4h&lTlA. bj\M 
RECEIPT 
Received of James F. Housley, Deputy Salt Lake 
County Attorney, $277.3-0 in currency seized by the Salt Lake 
City Police Department in case # 84-96051, 
I swear that I am the owner, and entitled to 
possession of said property. 
Dated this /Cf day of February, 1986. 
I . 0< ^JLUAjTf~~c5^-^ _ _ 
Carol/ Nesset-Sale Thomas Eugene Davis 
(ttorney for Thomas Eugene Davis 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
February, 1986. 
My Commission Expires: NOTARY PUBLIC residing 
in Salt Lake County, Utah 
00012C 
JUN13 1986 
l Dixon Hindtey, Clerk 3rd DisL Court 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD OTDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Oeputy Clerk 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CINDY L. SLAGOWSKI, GWENDOLYN 
CARTER HALL, THOMAS EUGENE 
DAVIS, CARL LINDELL BARR, and 
LARRY DARWIN PERSON, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CRH84-1483 
Before the Court is the defendant Davis1 Motion to Compel 
the Return of Property. The Court has heard argument on the 
matter, and allowed the parties an opportunity to brief their 
respective positions. The Court has now received the briefs 
from the parties, and has considered the oral argument, together 
with the matters set forth in the Memorandums of law submitted, 
and being otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
In this case the defendant Davis seeks an Order from this 
Court compelling the County Attorney's Office to return monies 
in the amount of $277.43 that were apparently taken from Mr. Davis 
at the time of his arrest. The case against «£. Davis was dismissed. 
Mr. Davis claims that he is the lawful ow^er of the money, and 
has done so by a brief Affidavit, dated February 6, 1986. The 
County Attorney on behalf of the State of Utah takes the position 
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:hat they are e n t i t l e d to inquire further of Mr, Davis beyond 
l i s Affidavit regarding his ownership of the funds in question, 
and have refused to return the above-mentioned monies to him. 
The County Attorney's Office also takes the position that any 
questions regarding the propriety or lack thereof of refusing 
to return the funds to Mr. Davis should be c i v i l in nature, 
and t h i s Court does not have jurisdiction to resolve the matter 
in the criminal f i l e . 
The statute that the parties seek to have this Court interpret 
as to their respective positions i s Section 77-24-2 of the Utah 
Code Ann., 1953 as amended, which provides in substance that 
property which has been seized incident to an arrest, and which 
i s no longer needed as evidence shall be returned to the owner 
i f he may lawful ly possess i t . That statutory provision i s 
found in the Criminal Code promulgated by the legislature, and 
t h i s Court determines that i t does have jurisdiction to review 
these matters as a result of the criminal case f i l ing , and is 
not r e s t r i c t e d to compelling the defendant to bring a c iv i l 
act ion to recover h i s funds. Therefore, in a proper case the 
Court does and should exercise i t s jurisdiction, and order the 
return of property seized at the arrest of a criminal defendant 
when the State later dismisses the charges. 
The Court determines, however, that i t i s not the purpose 
of the s t a t u t e to place an absolute, non-reviewable discretion 
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in the County Attorney's Office to determine whether or not 
property seized at the time of arrest should be returned to 
a criminal defendant. The statute does, however, provide the 
County Attorney with certain discretion ahd authority to make 
reasonable inquiry, if not directly by inference, into whether 
or not the defendant may fflawfully possess it." The Affidavit 
submitted by defendant Davis is inadequate in that regard, and 
his apparent refusal to comment further pursuant to the County 
Attorney's questions as to his acquisition of those funds is 
equally improper. If the defendant Davi? feels that he can 
make no stronger statement or explain further his claims to 
possession of the funds other than the conclusory statement 
that he is lawfully entitled to possess it, then the County 
Attorney is entitled to withhold the funds. 
Therefore the Court, based upon the state of the record 
at the present time, denies the Motion t|o Compel the return 
of the $277.43.. Should Mr. Davis be willing to answer reasonable 
questions and other inquiry of the County Attorney's Office 
regarding his lawful right to the funds, th^n he may be entitled 
to receive those funds from the County Ajttorney. This Court 
is of the opinion, however, that should a dispute arise as to 
whether or not a satisfactory explanation has bfcen made is reviewable 
by this Court in an appropriate evidentiary hearing, if such 
a request is made. 
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The Salt Lake County Attorney's Office is directed to prepare 
Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit 
le sane to the Court for review and signature in accordance 
.th the Local Rules of Practice. 
Dated this f6 day of June, 1986. 
J 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following, this_ .day of June, 198 6: 
Walter A. Ellett 
James Housley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale 
Attorney for Defendant 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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